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A HOAX: THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION MOVEMENT
JAMES W. CALLISON, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1975, LONG before any legislation was passed, I wrote an
article addressing various airline economic deregulation pro-
posals setting forth a number of reasons why extensive deregula-
tion was not necessary to achieve the professed goals of its sup-
porters.! In short, I put forth the thesis that arguments for airline
deregulation might be a hoax, because: (1) the prior Federal
Aviation Act2 was already procompetitive and, with the enlightened
application which it had generally received, had fostered extensive
although not unfettered competition; (2) the former law also
provided for price competition and, while the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB or the Board) had not been as liberal in this respect
as it had been concerning route competition, there was consider-
able price competition in the airline industry with Americans en-
joying the world's lowest airline passenger fares and air freight
rates; and (3) the former statute also guarded against the other
major ghost seen by the deregulators at that time, i.e., the specter
of anticompetitive agreements and practices adverse to the public
interest.'
* Senior Vice President-General Counsel, Delta Air Lines, Inc. For assistance
in preparing this article, the writer is grateful to his associates in the Law and
Economic Research Departments of Delta Air Lines, Inc., particularly to Don
M. Adams, Esq., Delta's Assistant Vice-President-Law.
1 Callison, Airline Deregulation-A Hoax?, 41 J. Am L. & CoM. 747 (1975).
2 Originally enacted as the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat.
973 (1938), and later reenacted without significant change, after review, as the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
3 In other contexts, the author noted that the prior Act recognized the gen-
eral public view that, in many respects, the airlines were public utilities. The
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Despite the general absence of need for airline deregulation typi-
fied by these examples,' Congress ultimately passed the Airline
statute therefore imparted a degree of stability and reliability of service, with
reasonable and steadily increasing but controlled degrees of competition, which
the public found satisfying.
Concerns were also expressed that extensive deregulation (as contrasted to
updating and modernizing the former statute, but retaining its basic approach)
could lead to instability and general deterioration of service, perhaps with major
airline services being concentrated in the hands of only a few strong, surviving
carriers. It was further argued that this would cause those who viewed the air-
lines as a type of public utility to press for new forms of regulation in order
to restore service-forms of regulation that, in the long run, would prove to be
more burdensome than the general utility type of regulation which had existed
since 1938. Indeed, there was a concern that serious deterioration of the system
under extensive deregulation could ultimately lead to nationalization. See, e.g.,
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958: Hearings on S. 292
and S. 689 before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the U.S. Senate Commerce
Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 2 at 861-933 (1977).
Whether these various concerns were correctly held, or whether the deregula-
tors were correct in their view that the drastic changes which they sought would
improve the already good air transportation system in this country and result
in a better allocation and use of resources, only time will tell. Until the transition
has been made to real deregulation and until the airline industry has experienced
a full cycle of good and bad economic conditions, the ultimate impact of exten-
sive deregulation on the airline industry and on the public cannot be told.
4 It might be asked then what caused the airline deregulation movement.
There were many causes, but the main ones seem to have been as follows.
First, for many years there existed fairly extensive academic interest in the
subject. A number of economics professors had said for some time that trans-
portation modes were in no sense public utilities, as they had been viewed in
the past. See, e.g., R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS: AN INDUSTRY
STUDY (1962); G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF Do-
MESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE
REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970); Keeler, Airline
Regulation and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT SCI. 399
(1972). These writers felt that air carriers had no inherent tendencies toward
monopoly, and that they could serve the public better at lower fares if they
were not regulated as utilities.
Second, this academic position was allegedly confirmed by the early experi-
ence of intrastate carriers in California and, more recently, in Texas, which,
operating without CAB regulation, were providing good service with low fares.
There were many reasons why these intrastate experiences should not have been
transposed into national economic models, as much of the academic thinking
did. Nevertheless, while the situation ultimately was quite different, especially
in California where the state eventually found it necessary to regulate more
rigidly in some respects than the CAB ever did, the experiences of the intra-
state carriers fed the early deregulation movement in the airline industry. See,
e.g., Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and Na-
tional Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965); Simat, Helliesen & Eichner,
The Intrastate Air Regulation Experience in Texas and California, in REGULA-
TION OF PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG THE AIRLINES 40 (P.
Macavoy & J. Snow eds. 1977).
Third, in the early 1970's the CAB made a number of moves which many
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viewed as being unduly anticompetitive, despite the procompetitive nature of the
Federal Aviation Act as it then existed. For example, because of the severe
economic adversities which many carriers suffered in the early 1970's, the CAB,
over objections by Delta Air Lines and others, temporarily approved a number
of so-called capacity control agreements among northern transcontinental car-
riers, which enabled those carriers to limit the degree of competition among
themselves in such markets as New York-Los Angeles, and to shift resources to
other markets where they competed with carriers which had not entered into
such anticompetitive agreements. For a history of these agreements see Capacity
Reduction Agreements Case, CAB Docket No. 22,908 (Nov. 6, 1974). Again
reacting to recessionary conditions, the CAB also imposed an informal "mora-
torium" on new route cases in the early 1970's. In addition, the CAB imposed
an especially rigid set of fare controls on the air transport industry during the
first half of the 1970's, not only over many objections by the carriers, but also
over the objections of some of the economists who had been calling for de-
regulation. See, e.g., Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Docket No.
21,866, Phase 9 (May 14, 1970).
During the same time period, 1970-1974, a number of the pro-deregulation
economists found their way into the Ford Administration, and began to criticize
the CAB's approaches, particularly concerning fares. This set the stage for a
concentrated effort to amend the agency's enabling statute.
Three actors quickly came on stage. One was President Ford, who used
deregulation in general and deregulation of the airline industry in particular, as
a major campaign issue during the 1975-1976 campaign. Various Ford Adminis-
tration deregulation proposals were advanced in those years, primarily the
Aviation Act of 1975, submitted to Congress in October, 1975 as S. 2551, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Also in the 1975-1976 time frame, Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary jumped the gun on the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
merce Committee before which the deregulation bills were pending. Senator
Kennedy's committee held a widely publicized hearing in 1976 regarding airline
deregulation, which further spurred the matter along. Oversight of Civil Aero-
nautics Board Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975).
The third actor was Senator Howard Cannon, then Chairman of the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee, who introduced a number of deregulation bills of his
own. His committee started a series of hearings in 1976 which, along with
hearings on still more deregulation bills in the House, ultimately spread over
three years, keeping matters at a high pitch. See Regulatory Reform in Air
Transportation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Reform of Economic Regulation
of Air Carriers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm.
on Public Works and Transp., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Hearings on S. 292
and S. 689 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); Aviation Regulatory Reform: Hearings on
H.R. 8813 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works and Transp., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977); Aviation Regulatory Re-
form: Hearings on H.R. 9297 and H.R. 11,145 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation
of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
President Ford lost the 1976 campaign but the subject of deregulation had
become so popular that President Carter also espoused the theory. With respect
to the airlines, he was convinced by his staff shortly after he assumed office that
he could exploit the movement, make a "quick hit," as they called it, by en-
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Deregulation Act of 1978 (the Act)' with respect to domestic
United States transportation. Congress has more recently passed
dorsing the airline deregulation bills then in Congress. Washington Star, Feb. 3,
1977, at A-6, col. 5; Washington Post, Feb. 24, 1977, at C13, col. 2.
Then came Alfred Kahn, an economics professor from Cornell University,
who was appointed Chairman of the CAB in June, 1977. He held essentially
the same views as those academics who had started the deregulation movement.
Therefore, without awaiting congressional action, he introduced such programs
as wholesale grants of new route authority on a multiple/permissive basis in
various markets, allowing market forces to decide which carriers would actually
enter a market and which ones would remain-a sort of facsimile-in-advance of
deregulation. See Oakland Service Case, CAB Docket No. 30,669, CAB Order Nos.
78-4-121 (Apr. 19, 1978) and 78-9-96 (Sept. 21, 1978); Improved Authority to
Wichita Case, CAB Docket No. 28,848, CAB Order No. 78-3-78 (Mar. 16,
1978).
These CAB actions happened to coincide with an upturn in the economy and
the consequent return of prosperous times to the airline industry-a rapid traffic
growth and increasing profits. This quasi-deregulation by the CAB was given
credit by many for this airline prosperity. There is good reason to question the
causal connection between these CAB policies and the favorable economic re-
sults which the industry experienced at that time, but the conditions helped
Senator Cannon move a strong deregulation bill through the Senate in early
1978. (S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1978)).
Largely as a result of the work of Representative Elliott Levitas of Georgia,
who introduced the concept of sunsetting the CAB after a transition period (see
H.R. 9297, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), the first of the airline regulatory re-
forms to propose sunset, sponsored by Rep. Levitas) the House also passed a
deregulation bill later that year. (H.R. 12,611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)).
Representative Levitas was the staunchest advocate of real deregulation on either
side of the Congress.
During a time of continuing airline prosperity, the bill which came out of
conference between the two chambers in the late fall of 1978 took many of
the strongest deregulation positions from both the Senate and House bills, and
forged them into what was clearly more deregulation than had been anticipated.
This bill easily passed during the closing hours of the 95th Congress. Finally
the congressional debates were over and the airline industry had new marching
instructions with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979)).
Viewed by hindsight, the leaders of the airline deregulation movement were
Senators Cannon and Kennedy, Congressman Elliott Levitas, Dr. Alfred Kahn,
and the Ford Administration, spurred on, of course, by the various academic
economists who pushed the theory in the beginning and throughout. The Carter
Administration also played a role, but its major contribution was appointing
Alfred Kahn to the CAB.
The absence of a significant public role throughout this period is a most
interesting facet of the airline deregulation movement. The impetus for change
came almost entirely from the academics and politicians; the public never did
call for deregulation of the airline industry. Various public opinion polls had
shown that the airlines consistently ranked at the very top among all industries
in terms of consumer satisfaction and confidence. See 236 Av. DAILY 118 (1978).
5 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. S 1301 (Supp.
1979)) [hereinafter cited only to the current code].
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a companion bill concerning international air transportation.!
This article will show that in many respects, the 1978 Act was
not entirely a hoax-it in fact extensively changed the system for
regulating United States domestic air transportation. In addition,
as administered by the CAB, the Act was far more deregulatory
than anything contemplated in 1975 when I questioned the authen-
ticity of the "reform" movement. On the other hand, this article
will demonstrate that Congress was unduly timid in this early
attempt at rolling back governmental regulation. Once Congress
chose to accept the economic theories behind deregulation, it
should have accepted them fully and boldly. The Act did only a
partial job: it left a number of the former controls in place, at
least temporarily; it imposed some new regulatory burdens upon
the airline industry; and worse, it left the CAB in existence. As a
consequence, relieved of its traditional responsibilities, the agency's
staff has in some respects turned its attention to new types of
regulation.
The lesson to be learned is that real deregulation can be achieved
only if the agency that has been responsible for the regulation is
abolished. Congress, to its credit, has provided for abolition of
the CAB in 1985.! Experience to date indicates, however, that
when Congress chose the option of extensive deregulation, it
should have abolished the agency immediately.
II. THE MAJOR DECREASES IN REGULATION UNDER
THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
To understand the deregulation law, it is necessary to compare
the economic theory of the law prior to 1978, and the theory that
Congress purported to adopt in the 1978 Act. This comparison
reveals that Congress only partially embraced the new economic
theories. A total commitment to deregulation would have com-
pelled the abolition of the CAB immediately, doing away with
virtually all economic regulation of the transportation industry.
"Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the international changes, see notes 114-23
infra and accompanying text.
7 49 U.S.C.A. § 1551(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
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A. The Differing Theories of the Prior and the Present Law
The prior law was patterned on the theory of transportation
economics and regulation which had existed in this country since
before the twentieth century. The theory held that common car-
rier transportation was in many respects a public utility. As such,
it was believed that fairly extensive economic regulation of routes,
fares, rates, intercarrier agreements, interlocking relationships,
mergers and acquisitions, with limited immunities from the anti-
trust laws, was necessary to insure that all portions of the public,
in both large markets and small markets, would be adequately
served.
At the heart of this prior system was the franchise or the licens-
ing program. In the airline industry, the CAB was mandated to
encourage airline competition. The basic statute was procompeti-
tive: "It is significant that Congress, addressing itself to the air
transport industry, deliberately fashioned this 1938 law [the Civil
Aeronautics Act, later the Federal Aviation Act of 1958] so as
to identify competition in express language as a key element of
the public interest."' The competition envisioned by the prior law
was not, however, to be unfettered competition: "[T]his was one
of an emerging group of statutes that did not regulate the so called
'natural monopolies' that identified conventional public utility regu-
lation, but instead called for 'regulated competition,' achieving the
benefits of competition without the evils of unrestrained entry or
undercost rate wars."" Indeed, the CAB was also mandated by the
prior law to foster sound economic conditions in the industry in
order to assure continuation and stability of service."
In practice, while the CAB's policies were most often pro-
competitive, the Board limited the number of carriers in a given
market to a level which it felt could operate economically." In
'Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 519 F.2d 944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'id.
1049 U.S.C. S 1302(b) (1976).
" Compare CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1969, at 2-8 (1969) (reflecting relatively rosy economic times, citing
a large number of new route awards including extensive amounts of new compe-
tition) with CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1971, at 1, 3-6 (1971) (reflecting much more adverse economic
conditions and thus exhibiting a period of CAB caution in establishing new
routes). See also Callison, Airline Deregulation-A Hoax?, 41 J. Am L. & CoM.
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this sense, the franchise system achieved the desired stability and
continuity of service. This did, however, somewhat restrain com-
petition even though by the early 1970's, before the deregulation
movement got underway, over 79% of the nation's scheduled air
passenger traffic was already competitively served" and, in most
major markets, multiple carriers were certificated.13 Moreover, the
prior law specifically prohibited the CAB from restricting the
right of an air carrier, once certificated, to add to or change
schedules, equipment, accommodations and facilities for perform-
ing the authorized air transportation and service as the develop-
ment of its business and the demands of the public required."
Thus, not only was competition fostered under the prior law, but
once certificated, the carriers were allowed to compete in what-
ever manner they desired, generally free of governmental dictation
as to the quantity or quality of their service. The licensing system
nevertheless imposed some restraint on new entrants and on entry
by existing carriers into new markets.
In return for this competitively oriented yet somewhat restrain-
ing licensing system, the old law imposed firm public service re-
sponsibilities on air carriers. Such responsibilities included: obli-
gations to serve both large and small communities and both large
and small markets except where the CAB relieved a carrier of
responsibility at a specific city;" CAB control over airline rates
and fares;" extensive control over airline accounts, with elaborate
reporting requirements;" prohibitions against unfair practices and
747, 769-71 n.71 (1975) (citing cases decided during varying economic con-
ditions).
1 Based on domestic scheduled carrier revenue passenger miles in 1972, 5
CAB 0 & D of Airline Passenger Traffic-Domestic (1972 addition).
13 For example, three carriers were authorized to operate in each of the
New York-Los Angeles, New York-Miami, Chicago-Atlanta, Chicago-Miami and
Dallas/Ft. Worth-Los Angeles markets. In some markets, Atlanta-Miami/Ft.
Lauderdale and New York-Chicago, as many as five carriers were authorized.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, CAB AIRLINE RouTE MAPS AND AIRPORT TO AIR-
PORT MILEAGE (1978).
1449 U.S.C. 5 1371(e)(4) (1976).
1 Even then, this could be done only after due process including hearings for
all parties concerned, especially the communities involved. Id. § 1371(g), (j).
16 Id. 1373, 1374 & 1482.
1 1ld. 5 1377, 1385.
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unfair competition;" and various other controls and monitoring
of airline operations. 9
It was a balanced system-mild restraints on entry and competi-
tion in return for firm public service obligations of the carriers.
The economic principles espoused by proponents of airline de-
regulation point 180 degrees in the opposite direction. These
principles state that airlines are in no manner public utilities, but
are just like any other business. The theories hold that these
businesses are also of importance to the public, are not govern-
mentally controlled, and yet their services and products are forth-
coming at reasonable prices in an atmosphere where the absence
of economic regulation and the interplay of free market forces
allows for maximum efficiencies and allocations of resources.
Hence, air transportation will react similarly and optimum air
service will result if the government simply gets out of the way
so that the marketplace determines the price, quality, variety, and
quantity of services.
Senator Howard Cannon, a principal architect of the Airline
Deregulation Act, stated that the increased, if "imperfect competi-
tion," which is supposed to result from extensive deregulation,
should allocate resources better than the "imperfect regulation"
that previously existed.' The "imperfect regulation" which existed
under the prior law did produce the world's foremost air trans-
portation system, with more service in more markets by more
carriers with more competition with greater variety at lower rates
and fares than existed anywhere else on earth. Only time will tell
whether the new law will improve on this system."
'
81d. 5 1381.
18 For example, rules and regulations for the carriage of mail and the setting
of the rate of compensation therefor, id. SS 1375 & 1376; CAB control over mer-
gers, consolidations and acquisitions of control, id. § 1378; prohibitions against
interlocking relationships, id. § 1379; CAB scrutiny of intercarrier agreements,
id. § 1378; and a small number of broad investigatory and enforcement powers,
id. § 1324, 1385 & 1482.
" Speech by Senator Howard Cannon before the National Association of
State Aviation Officials (Aug. 22, 1979).
21 There are some who cite the deregulation law as a major cause of current
financial problems for many members of the air transport industry. See, e.g.,
Speech by Frederick Bradley, Jr., Vice President of Citibank of North America,
to the National Aviation Club, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 17, 1980) reprinted in
247 Av. DAILY 97 (1980). But whether that be so or not, it is the major theme
of this paper that because of congressional actions in the Act of 1978 and the
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
B. The Major Changes
In any event, Congress has adopted the new theory in major
respects and, as Alfred Kahn predicted, the industry has been
thoroughly "scrambled."' It is now too late to return to the prior
system, whatever the results. There has in fact been deregulation
in many areas, and as a practical matter many profound changes
have resulted in both the governmental system and in the indus-
try. The following are a few of the highlights.
1. Future Abolition of Civil Aeronautics Board
The 1978 Act has scheduled two major diminutions in the CAB's
power, leading toward its eventual abolition. As of January 1,
1982, the CAB will lose virtually all of its power to control entry
into the air transportation business or entry by carriers into new
markets." After that date, a regime of essentially free entry will
exist within United States domestic air transportation.
One year later, on January 1, 1983, the CAB will effectively
lose all of its power over airline passenger fares:' (it has already
lost most of its power over air freight rates).' At the same time
the CAB's remaining authority over domestic airline mergers and
interlocking relationships between domestic air carriers, and its
remaining power to confer antitrust immunity with respect to
agreements and arrangements between domestic air carriers, will
be transferred to the Department of Justice."
By no later than January 1, 1984, the CAB is required to report
to Congress concerning the progress and effects of deregulation.'
Assuming that Congress does not change its mind because of
consequences thereof, it is impossible for the industry or the government to "go
home again" to the old system of regulation and that the best course now is
total deregulation and early abolition of the Civil Aeronautics Board. This, it
might be noted, would largely satisfy Mr. Bradley's concerns, because he sees
the actions of the CAB under the newly revised law as a significant cause of the
post-deregulation financial woes of some carriers. Id.
"Kahn's prediction came while he was Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and, in part, reflected deregulatory efforts by the CAB under his leadership,
even before Congress amended the law to provide for such activities.




0 Id. 5 1551(a)(3).
"'Id. 5 1551(c).
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these reports, or for some other reason, the agency is scheduled
to go out of existence on January 1, 1985." At that time, the
Board's authority with respect to foreign air transportation will
be transferred to the Department of Transportation, which will
have to exercise this new authority in consultation with the De-
partment of State."' Simultaneously, the Board's authority con-
cerning mergers, intercarrier agreements and antitrust immunities
relating to foreign air transportation will be transferred to the
Department of Justice, which will have received similar authority
concerning domestic air transportation. The Board's power to
determine rates for the carriage of mail in interstate and overseas
air transportation will be transferred to the Postal Service, which
will be obligated to exercise such authority through "negotiations
or competitive bidding."' Jurisdiction over rates for foreign trans-
portation of mail will be transferred to the Department of Trans-
portation, which must exercise the authority in consultation with
the Department of State."1
2. Route Entry
In the short span of just over one year since the airline deregula-
tion law was passed, the domestic air transport route system has
been completely opened. In contrast to the entry restraints which
existed under the prior law, air carriers can now fly virtually
any place they choose. There are indications in the Conference
Report that Congress perhaps did not intend the transition to
open route entry to proceed as rapidly as it has, but to have oc-
curred gradually over the full period between 1978 and Decem-
ber 31, 1981. Despite these indications, once the decision was
made to adopt many of the free market theories and to deregulate
significantly, this rapid transition was the only proper course of
" Id. 5 1551(a)(4).
29
Id. 5 1551(b)(1)(B).
3OSee generally id. S 1551(b).
311d. § 1551(b)(1)(B).
22 The statute does not call for totally open entry until January 1, 1982. Id.
1551(a)(1). Even after December 31, 1981, a certificate will still be required
unless the law is amended to eliminate this technicality, but the only prerequisite
will be that the applicant be "fit, willing, and able to perform such transporta-
tion properly." Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1371(d)(1)
& 1551(a)(1) (Supp. 1979).
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action. Any slower pace would have resulted in discriminatory
and unfair treatment of particular carriers and particular areas
of the country.
Under the revised law, a certificate is still technically required,
but freely given in the case of a fit applicant despite the existence
of statutory standards other than "fitness" which go virtually un-
noticed.' Utilizing the procedural reforms in the new statute,
the current CAB employs non-hearing show cause procedures with
respect to most domestic route applications, and grants them in
a matter of weeks after issuing the initial show cause order. It
soon became apparent that objections to show cause orders on
grounds other than the applicant's fitness (e.g., that the proposed
service "is not consistent with the public convenience and neces-
sity"") were futile. As a result, very few objections are filed today
with respect to applications for expansion rights,' and the "certifi-
cation" process is especially swift.'
Multiple authorizations have been granted in numerous city
3 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1551 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979).
-Id. §§ 1371(d)(1)(A), 1371(d)(9)(B), & 1371(d)(9)(C). See Iowa/
Illinois-Atlanta Route Proceeding, CAB Docket No. 30,182, CAB Order No.
78-12-35, at 1-2 (Dec. 7, 1978).
'In a few cases involving wholly new entrants (carriers that did not form-
erly operate a significant volume of interstate or intrastate scheduled service or
charter service), the examination of fitness consumes more time. See Application
of Air North, CAB Order No. 79-10-25 (Oct. 11, 1979); Application of Altair,
CAB Order No. 79-5-245 (May 31, 1979); Application of Empire, CAB Order
No. 79-5-243 (May 13, 1979).
-"There are other processes for swift certification provided in the new
statute (although the show cause procedure is the most commonly used): (a)
The Automatic Market Entry Program, which allows each certificated carrier
to apply for any one domestic market during the first thirty days of each
calendar year of 1979, 1980, and 1981, and which requires the CAB (with
virtually no discretion) to grant the requested authority within sixty days, Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371(d)(7)(A) (Supp. 1979);
(b) The Unused Authority Provisions, which allow carriers to apply for and
receive authority in markets for which another carrier is certificated but not
providing service (these sections of the law require carriers awarded dormant
rights to institute services within forty-five days of the award or forfeit the
authority), id. § 1371(d)(5). These provisions were used extensively immediately
after passage of the Act of 1978, but now, in view of the wide availability of
other procedures lie largely dormant.
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pairs."' While some of the former intrastate carrierse and some
of the former charter-only carriers have expanded into scheduled
interstate markets, most new route awards have been made to
carriers previously certificated as scheduled interstate operators.
The high cost of new jet aircraft, the long lead time involved in
their purchase, and the large pre-inaugural investment required
to operate extensive airline services have discouraged the new
entrepreneur in most markets of significant size."'
3. Service Obligations
Interestingly enough, however, the bulk of the new certifications
has not been utilized. By and large, air carriers are simply banking
new authorities to have maximum flexibility until 1982, when
the deregulation law strips the CAB of all authority over domestic
airline route entry, except for determinations of "fitness."
As this indicates, under the new law, much more than was so
under the prior system, certificates carry no obligations either to
begin or maintain services, except in the case of certain small
communities: "Under the new Act, mandatory authority, whether
in domestic or foreign air transportation, no longer exists; airlines
are not required to institute newly authorized service or obtain
Board permission before terminating or suspending operations as
long as they provide the statutory notice under section 401 (j)."*
4. Route Exit
The corollary to deregulation of route entry is freedom to exit
" See, e.g., Pacific Northwest-St. Louis-East Show Cause Proceeding, CAB
Order No. 79-11-144 (Nov. 21, 1979); Improved Authority to Wichita Case,
CAB Order No. 79-11-98 (Nov. 15, 1979); Florida Service Case, CAB Order
No. 79-9-177 (Sept. 27, 1979); California-Arizona Low-Fare Route Proceeding,
CAB Order No. 79-9-176 (Sept. 27, 1979); Denver-Alaska Service Investigation,
CAB Order No. 79-8-16 (Aug. 2, 1979).
38 For example, Air Florida, whose operations were confined to the state of
Florida prior to passage of the deregulation act; Air California and Pacific South-
west Airlines, which operated solely within California; and Southwest Airlines,
which confined its operation to the state of Texas.
19 Commuter carriers have been authorized to serve a number of markets,
usually in fairly confined geographic areas, which have been exited by the
larger air carriers. See, e.g., Certificate of Air California, CAB Order No. 79-6-187
(June 28, 1979); Chicago-Midway Expanding Service Proceeding, CAB Order
No. 79-9-55 (Sept. 13, 1979).
o CAB Order No. 79-5-56, at 2-3 (May 3, 1979).
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
markets. The basic economic theory that the government should
step out of the way and that market forces should govern air serv-
ices can be implemented only if air carriers have both exit and
entry freedom. The marketplace cannot function unless carriers
are given discretion not only to exit unprofitable markets, but also
to shift resources from a market where profits are being realized,
to markets where greater profits can be realized.
The revised law does in fact afford air carriers increased flexi-
bility to exit markets. In contrast to the prior law's requirement
that an application for suspension or termination be filed, and
that CAB approval first be granted after full administrative pro-
ceedings, including hearings, the new procedure allows an air car-
rier to terminate all services at a community simply by giving
ninety days' advance notice.'
While there are procedures which permit the registering of ob-
jections to proposed terminations and suspensions, ' in most cases
the ninety-day notice is all that is required before a carrier can
exit a community and its air transportation market. This is true
even though the CAB is authorized in certain cases to require con-
tinued service beyond the ninetieth day where the exiting carrier
is the last air carrier serving a particular community and a replace-
ment is not readily forthcoming. '
On the whole, and to the extent Congress permitted, the CAB
has implemented liberalized exit in accordance with the free mar-
ket economic theories. This has been beneficial to existing air
carriers because, in many instances, new authorities obtained under
deregulation have been exercised only as a result of a shifting
of resources away from markets previously served." In some in-
stances, more than one carrier has terminated service at the same
point,' and at some of these communities service has dropped from
41 "Under the Deregulation Act, the requirement for prior Board approval
in order to suspend or terminate service has been eliminated, and replaced with,
a notice requirement." Notice of Intent of Pan American World Airways, Inc. to
Suspend Nonstop Service (San Juan-Madrid), CAB Order No. 79-12-197, at 2
(Dec. 28, 1979).
14 C.F.R. § 323 (1979).
"Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371(j)(1) (Supp. 1979).
"The approach has also helped new entrants, of course, especially com-
muter carriers which are entering many of the smaller markets being vacated.
4See, e.g., Notice of Delta Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service to Asheville,
1980]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
two or three or more carriers to a single carrier.' In some cases, re-
placements, mostly small commuter carriers, have stepped in to
fill service gaps." While exit rights have been significantly increased
by the new law, the restrictions placed on exit exhibit serious mis-
givings by Congress about the free market theories upon which it
professed to rely in passing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
These congressionally imposed restrictions have severely circum-
scribed exit rights at small communities.
During a ten-year transition period, the CAB (and after it goes
out of existence in 1985, the Department of Transportation) has
been given power to require the last air carrier serving any com-
munity to maintain what is called "essential air service"' until a
North Carolina, CAB Docket No. 33,907 (Nov. 1, 1978); Notice of United
Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service to Merced, California, CAB Docket No.
34,117 (Nov. 28, 1978); Notice of United Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service
to Asheville, North Carolina, CAB Docket No. 34,119 (Nov. 11, 1978).
'" See, e.g., Notice of Delta Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service to Asheville,
North Carolina, CAB Docket No. 33,907 (Nov. 1, 1978); Notice of United
Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service to Merced, California, CAB Docket No.
34,117 (Nov. 28, 1978); Notice of United Air Lines, Inc. to Terminate Service
to Asheville, North Carolina, CAB Docket No. 34,119 (Nov. 11, 1978).
r Notice of Delta Air Lines, Inc. to Suspend Service to Presque Isle/Houlton,
Maine, CAB Docket No. 34,742 (Feb. 13, 1979).
" The Small Community Program of the Deregulation Act guarantees "essen-
tial air service" to two groups of points which Congress feared might lose vital
air service if left to the mercy of market forces. Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389 (Supp. 1979).
The first group of cities are those named in air carrier certificates which
received service from one or more certificated carriers as of October 24, 1978,
the date of the deregulation law's enactment. As of that date, there were 555 such
communities, including 228 points in Alaska. Part 398, CAB Docket No. 34,650,
at 1 (May 3, 1979). For these points, Congress guaranteed essential air service,
including subsidized service where necessary. See generally Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389 (Supp. 1979). According to the statute, the
CAB has the discretion to determine essential air service, but, for points other
than those in Alaska, the statute requires a minimum of at least two round
trips five days per week, or the level of service in 1977, whichever is less. Id.
§ 1389(f)(1). The standard is lower for Alaskan points. Id. § 1389(f)(2).
Any carrier proposing to withdraw essential air service must provide notice of
its intent (ninety days, if it is a certificated carrier; thirty days, if not), and the
CAB may require it to continue serving the point until a willing replacement car-
rier can be found. Id. § 1389(a)(3)(b). Similarly, essential air service must be
determined and guaranteed for any point whose service is reduced to one
certificated carrier after October 24, 1978. Id. § 1389(a) (2)(B).
The second group of cities are those which the CAB designates as eligible
points among communities which were deleted from carriers' certificates between
July 1, 1968, and October 24, 1978. Id. S 1389(b). The agency has recently
implemented procedures to determine eligible points under this phase of the
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suitable replacement can be found and judged fit by the CAB.
This power exists even though the effects of free entry elsewhere
on a carrier's system might dictate an earlier shifting of resources
away from the community in question." Distrustful of the market-
place, Congress also gave the CAB new powers to define "essential
air service" within parameters laid down by Congress itself, and
authorized the agency to pay compensation to the incumbent for
losses incurred during any period of required continuance of serv-
ice beyond the carrier's planned termination date.'
This small community program was a major excuse for con-
tinuing the CAB in existence despite so-called deregulation, and
the CAB is exercising considerable watchdog activities in this area.
Indeed, as the number of service terminations has mounted, officials
of small and medium-sized communities, where the greatest loss
of service has occurred, and their congressmen and senators, have
begun to bring pressure to bear on the agency to become more
restrictive concerning exit. To its credit, the CAB has endeavored
to resist these pressures, but it nevertheless has gradually begun
to impose stricter standards. 1 If general economic conditions were
to turn even more sour than they are today, the existing, rather
elaborate federal machinery for the protection of "essential air
Small Community Program. 14 C.F.R. § 270 (1979). Like the other eligible
communities, those made eligible under this program will have essential air
service determined, with federal subsidies supporting the service where necessary,
but in the normal situation the CAB cannot order a carrier to commence service
at a point not being served by the carrier. Id.
Still on the drawing board is a White House program to sponsor develop-
mental air services for isolated or depressed areas of the country. Discussions
have taken place between administration officials and other governmental officials,
including representatives of the CAB and Congress, concerning the prospects for
development of federal/state or local cost-sharing arrangements to support such
developmental services. No concrete proposals have yet been advanced for such
programs, however.
49 There is no law, of course, which directly forbids a grocer from closing
one or more of his stores if he desires. If airlines are to be equated to corner
groceries and other members of the normal business community, as they were
by the deregulation theories upon which Congress relied, they should enjoy,
but have been denied similar freedom.
50 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1389(a)(7) (Supp. 1979).
51 See, e.g., Application of Delta Air Lines, Inc. to Suspend Service, CAB
Docket No. 34,742 (Feb. 13, 1979); Application of United Air Lines to Termi-
nate or Suspend Service, CAB Docket No. 34,812 (Feb. 23, 1979); Application
of Hughes Air Corp. to Suspend Service, CAB Docket No. 34,148 (Dec. 1,
1978).
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service" could be used to regulate air carriers anew in many ways.
In addition, there are indications that efforts may be made to
amend the existing statute to withdraw some of the new exit
rights." Thus far, the major congressional supporters of deregula-
tion have resisted these efforts, but as air carriers exercise their
exit rights, which will often be an economic necessity, especially
in view of the fuel crisis," added pressures to amend the statute
could materialize.
Any such withdrawal of exit freedom would be disastrous for
air carriers. It would be extremely difficult to operate successfully
under a regime where entry was free, but exit rights were severely
curtailed. Senator Cannon has expressed the problem this way:
An important understanding which I wish to emphasize . ..is
that there is no half-regulation, half-deregulation solution which
is feasible. We cannot, for example, go back and re-regulate exit,
leaving entry and rates deregulated. Carriers cannot be told both
that they must maintain services which result in losses, and that
they are free to enter new markets at low fares to out-compete
airlines which in turn cannot change their services in response
to the new competition. Such an irrational economic basis would
not be feasible."
In theory a return to the prior system, where both entry and exit
were regulated, would be preferable to a change which only
tightened up the exit side of the equation. The nation's air trans-
port system has been so transformed as a result of deregulation,
however, that there is no practical way to return to the past.
Indeed, the best course of action now would be to complete the
deregulation effort, and totally abolish the CAB at an early date,
removing all regulation of entry and exit, and freeing the indus-
try from all other types of specialized economic and consumerist
regulation now exercised by the CAB. Whether that happens or
not, and despite objections by some and increasing caution by the
CAB, airline market exit rights have been increased significantly
by the revised law.
11 H.R. 4185, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
'Deregulation has exacerbated the effects of the fuel crisis on airlines, both
in terms of supply and the price which air carriers must pay.
5 Impact of Airline Deregulation on Service to Small and Medium Sized
Communities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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5. Rates and Fares
In domestic air transportation, air freight rates, airline all cargo
service, and in most respects cargo service provided on combi-
nation passenger/cargo aircraft, are now almost totally deregu-
lated." Airlines have always acted individually in setting prices
for domestic air freight and passenger service, rather than by
conference as is done in some other transportation modes. Under
the new law, however, airlines can set each individual air freight
rate at any level any particular carrier desires, without significant
governmental control or interference."
Even the official air freight tariff system has been abolished,"1
although airlines still maintain a private system of air freight
tariffs. The private system, however, does not have the force of
law that official CAB tariffs had, and the new tariff system is
severely circumscribed by the antitrust laws."
With respect to passenger fares, the CAB's powers of suspension
and investigation have been modified by providing for "zones"
within which a carrier may raise or lower fares without CAB inter-
ference, subject to certain notice conditions and residual CAB
jurisdiction over predation, unjust discrimination and undue pref-
erence or prejudice. The law provides for an upward no-suspend
zone in "non-monopoly markets" of 5% above the "standard in-
dustry fare level" (SIFL), defined as the fares in effect on July
1, 1977, as adjusted for cost changes since that time. The law also
permits carriers to reduce fares as much as 50% below the SIFL,
unless the CAB finds that the reduced fares violate the federal
antitrust laws."
m Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1388(b) (Supp. 1979).
56 The agency retains jurisdiction over "unjustly discriminatory" and "un-
duly preferential or unduly prejudicial" (and now "predatory") rates and fares,
id. § 1482(d) but, in theory at least, this should not give it control over rate or
fare levels per se.
57 Cargo tariffs abolished in Amendment to Part 291, CAB Docket No. 33,093;
upheld by National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. CAB, No. 78-2163
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 11, 1980).
"As discussed infra at notes 100-05 and accompanying text, as economic
regulation of routes, rates, fares, intercarrier agreements and the like abates with
respect to any form of transportation, so should the immunities from the anti-
trust laws which usually accompanied such regulation.
"Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1482(d) (4) (Supp. 1979).
The CAB also has the power to expand the range. Id. § 1482(d)(7).
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Even before the new Act was passed, the CAB had revised its
fare policies in order to permit increases in fares without CAB
interference by as much as 10% above the then-prescribed ceiling
fares in markets authorized to four or more carriers, by as much
as 5% in markets authorized to two or three carriers, and up to
5% for 58 days in one year in "monopoly" markets."° These ex-
panded ranges of flexibility (broader than the statute in some
respects) are proposed to be restated so that they will relate to
the revised Act's SIFL." The CAB is also continuing to encour-
age lower fares by allowing carriers to reduce fares even below
the statutory zone-up to 70% below the SIFL on 40% of total
available seat miles." More recently, the agency has discussed
yet another rulemaking that is designed to encourage peak and
off-peak pricing by removing the ceiling entirely in "short haul
markets" and, with respect to other markets, by removing the
ceiling as to 20% of the total seats in any given city pair. This
would allow carriers to raise fares in a market on peak days such
as a Friday, in order to encourage travel on other days. At this
time the proposal has simply been discussed in a "sunshine meet-
ing," and a notice of proposed rulemaking has not yet been issued.
As indicated, the SIFL starts with the coach fares which were
in effect July 1, 1977, adjusted on the basis of industry cost
changes between that date and July 1, 1979, when these legisla-
tive provisions of the law took effect. From that date forward,
the CAB is obligated to raise or lower the SIFL semiannually for
changes in reported airline costs, without any adjustment to those
costs." The requirement that actual costs be considered without
regulatory adjustment is essential to the establishment of airline
managerial freedom and discretion over fares.
Under the prior law, even though the industry was characterized
by low fares and extensive price competition, the CAB used many
"0 CAB Policy Statement PS-80, CAB Docket No. 33,237 (Aug. 25, 1978),
published at 43 Fed. Reg. 38,064 (1978).
01 Proposed CAB Policy Statement PSDR-61, CAB Docket No. 31,290 (May
17, 1979). Pending finalization of this proposal, the CAB is already applying the
new policies on an ad hoc basis.
2 Proposed CAB Policy Statement PSDR-61, CAB Docket No. 31,290 (May
23, 1979).
"Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1482(d)(6)(B) (Supp.
1979).
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techniques to hold down the rate and fare level. The legal powers
most often used were the powers to suspend proposed rates and
fares, to investigate them, and to order changes in rates or fares
believed by the agency after investigation to be unlawful under
one or more of various statutory standards. These powers have
been circumscribed by the "zone of reasonableness," within which
the agency is powerless to suspend, investigate, or order changes."
The practical device most often used under the prior law was to
"disallow" airline costs which the agency concluded were im-
properly incurred.' This device is no longer available to the agency
with respect to the SIFL, which thus increases or decreases in
accordance with general economic conditions and with the actual
cost experience of the airlines.
Currently, because of the rapidly escalating cost of aviation
fuel, the CAB is using its remaining powers over the passenger
fare level to allow changes more frequently than semiannually
in the SIFL. Thus, the SIFL is adjusted semiannually to take ac-
count of all changes in airline costs, with interim modifications
based solely on changes in airline fuel expenses." Although there
are differences of opinion between the air carriers and the CAB
as to whether the agency is actually permitting recovery of all
increases in fuel expenses, or is acting speedily enough in view
of the rapidity with which fuel costs are escalating, these various
adjustments in the SIFL are nevertheless the bases for the current,
necessarily repetitive increases in airline passenger fares. This
general condition of mildly increased freedom with respect to
passenger fares will continue to exist until January 1, 1983, at
which time the passenger tariff system will cease to exist and the
CAB will lose virtually all control over airline fares."
The foregoing relates to the industry's "basic fares," that is,
"Id. 5 1482(d)(4).
"For examples of the use of these techniques, see the many decisions in
the CAB's comprehensive Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, CAB Docket
No. 21,866 (1971-1975) (decided in 10 phases).
"See, e.g., Establishment of the Interim Standard Industry Fare Level, CAB
Order Nos. 79-12-162 (Dec. 21, 1979), 79-10-172 (Oct. 25, 1979), 79-8-184
(Aug. 31, 1979) and 79-6-96 (June 14, 1979).
"
7 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. 51551(a) (2) & 1388(b)(2)
(Supp. 1979). As mentioned above, the law vests residual power in the CAB over
predatory, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential fares, rates and charges.
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day coach, night coach, and first class fares. In addition to the new
and gradually increasing freedoms the industry has with respect
to these fares, the new law increased the freedom which air car-
riers had under the prior law to engage in differential or discount
pricing. 8 Discounted fares are made available under limitations,
rules and regulations which distinguish the discounted fare traveler
from the full fare passenger (for example, by requiring advance
purchase of tickets and restricting the times of permissible travel).
The discount fares are designed to attract passengers who would
not otherwise travel, to fill seats which would otherwise fly empty
to shift traffic from peak to off-peak travel, or to promote and
develop a new market. The CAB's Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion exhibits a growing tendency to engage in "consumer protec-
tion" regulation with respect to discount fares, but the freedom
to engage in such differential pricing is essentially guaranteed and
enhanced by the whole thrust of the new law.
Thus, the new law has given the airlines significantly increased
pricing flexibility, with more freedom to come after January 1,
1983. Until at least that date, however, upward pricing flexibility
is not as extensive as it should be in view of the rapid pace at
which the CAB has been proceeding in opening route entry and
in greatly increasing competition through the agency's extremely
liberal application of that facet of the new law. Through its pres-
ent control over the timing and, to some degree, over the extent
of changes in the SIFL, its control over fare changes outside the
zone of reasonableness, and otherwise, the CAB continues to
regulate airline pricing so far as carrier managements seek price
increases required by inflation and fuel cost escalation.
The way to hamstring any industry, promote dislocation of re-
sources and distort productivity, is to control prices. The adverse
effects of the remaining CAB control are exacerbated because of
the bureaucratic time lag which, although decreasing, is still im-
peding recovery of significant cost increases over which the air-
lines have no real control, most notably the astronomical and
rapid increases in the price of aviation fuel. Delta Air Lines and
many other air carriers look forward to 1983 when the CAB
loses virtually all control over airline passenger fares, as it has
68ld. S 1482(d)(4).
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over air freight rates. Then, airline deregulation will deserve the
"hoax" label far less than it does today."
6. Reduced Reporting Requirements and CAB Staffing
While the Deregulation Act itself did little to reduce the airline
industry's burdensome reporting requirements, the CAB does ap-
pear to be moving in that direction on its own, through interpreta-
tion of the statute. Thus, the Board is conducting a comprehen-
sive evaluation of its reporting requirements and financial and
statistical information publications in order to restructure its regu-
latory information activities in light of the procompetitive directions
of, and the hoped-for decrease in governmental involvement with,
the industry." The Board's efforts are designed to improve the
quality of the information both received and disseminated by it,
but it is too early to tell the results of those efforts. Indeed, the
Board has increased some reporting requirements while reducing
others. 1
Similarly, while the continued existence of the CAB's bureau-
cracy is antithetical to deregulation, there are indications that
the agency's leadership is committed to reducing the size of its
staff between now and 1985, when it is currently slated to go out
of existence. For example, the current Chairman of the CAB,
Marvin S. Cohen, is unequivocal about his commitment to dis-
mantle the agency. In an appearance before the House Appro-
priations Subcommittee for the agency's current fiscal year budget,
Mr. Cohen was greeted by questions from congressional members
implying skepticism that the CAB would ever sunset:
Mr. Duncan (Oregon, Chairman):
After all, 1985 is a long time away. Is there an air of disbelief
that it ain't really going to happen, that somehow or other you will
11 The label will have to remain, however, even after fare regulation is
diminished further in 1983, until the industry is also taken out from under the
yoke of the new "consumer protection" regulation that deregulation has spawned.
See notes 89-97 infra and accompanying text.
7CAB Press Release No. 79-186 (Aug. 20, 1979).
1 For example, in CAB Docket No. 37,088, the Board proposed to make
mandatory an extensive, very expensive passenger statistic reporting requirement
that was voluntary prior to deregulation. On the other hand, in CAB Docket
Nos. 34,015 and 35,514, the Board is proposing to reduce or eliminate certain
statistical reporting and travel agency commission filing requirements.
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follow the long and honorable tradition of Government agencies
and refuse to fade away?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I have heard some skepticism. [Laughter.]
Mr. Duncan. I bet you did.
Mr. Cohen. Both in and out of the agency. Everytime I do, I tell
them that if I am around I am going to do my best to see that it
happens because I strongly believe it should. But, it is a very
healthy precedent and an historic precedent for the Government."
On the other hand, and in spite of the CAB Chairman's an-
nounced objectives, the original CAB budget request for fiscal
year (FY) 1980 actually called for increased appropriations of
$106.8 million (as opposed to a $100.5 million actual budget for
the prior year) and a reduction in permanent employee staffing of
only eleven persons (830 persons in FY 1979 versus 819 requested
positions in FY 1980)."' In part these reductions are being ac-
complished by contracting with outside consultants to handle
various CAB functions.' The budget proposal for FY 1981
shows a further reduction of 53 employees.' Ironically, the
CAB's projections in its original budget request for FY 1980
called for a staff of 500 persons even in 1985, the year the agency
is scheduled to sunset." The May, 1979, amendment to the FY
1980 request proposed a $2,263,000 reduction in the FY 1980
budget, but also requested a $19,664,000 supplemental budget to
cover subsidy requirements. The FY 1981 request proposes a
budget of approximately $105,000,000'---$4,500,000 more than
the FY 1979 Budget.
7. Differing Carrier Reactions
Before turning to the subject of added regulation under the new
law, and particularly the increased application of the antitrust
72Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1979).
73 Id. at 108. See generally id. Part 2, at 143-641 (1980 Budget Justifications).
4 Id. Part 6, at 118.
, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. of the House Appropriations
Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
" Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 6, at 203 (1979).
" See note 75, supra.
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laws to the air transport industry, it is both interesting and instruc-
tive to examine the varying reactions of air carriers to the new
freedoms. The major reaction has been in the area of route entry.
Because the CAB quickly, and correctly, gave the domestic air
transport industry almost total freedom in this area, carriers have
been able to move as rapidly or as slowly as they desired into new
markets.
Some carriers have engaged in explosive modifications of their
systems-expanding into new markets here, abandoning other
markets there, and then abandoning some of the new markets.
In some cases, the rationale for rapid system adjustments may
be that only large carriers will survive deregulation, as many op-
ponents of deregulation predicted, 8 and therefore a frantic effort
must be made to expand and change quickly to prepare for the
onslaught of open competition and avoid merger or other extinc-
tion." Whatever the motivation, some of the carriers which have
reacted to deregulation with erratic changes are suffering acute
financial problems. Whether they will persist cannot yet be told.
Other carriers, including Delta, while using the new freedom
to achieve orderly and significant growth and to streamline their
systems, have proceeded in a more careful and deliberate fashion.
Such an approach is important for companies like Delta which
believe that reliability and stability of service (while accommo-
dating growth and other operational changes) constitute an essen-
tial feature of common carrier operations, are important to the
maintenance of good public relations, and are necessary to a
successful business image.
Someplace between carriers reacting explosively and erratically
and those reacting deliberately, lie the regional air carriers (form-
" Even some of the proponents recognized the possibility that only a few large
carriers might survive, but argued that it "would not be a problem." See Miller,
A Perspective on Airline Regulatory Reform, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 679, 696
(1975).
"' Two of the former regional carriers, Southern Airways and North Central
Airlines, have merged and taken a new name: Republic Airlines. In the trunk-
line branch of the industry, National Air Lines has disappeared through merger
into Pan American Airways. Another proposed merger, between Continental and
Western, was disapproved by the CAB (contrary, some argue, to the theory
of deregulation, that market forces should govern such decisions subject only
to the antitrust laws, not an administrative agency). Rumors persist that there
will be other mergers.
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erly called the local service carriers). Most of these carriers were
opposed to extensive deregulation, believing that they could not
survive in the absence of public utility type governmental protec-
tion and controls. Regardless of their survival chances in the long
term, these carriers are generally growing faster thus far under
deregulation than are the larger carriers, and generally are doing
so with relatively favorable financial results.' Deregulation has
enabled these carriers to move rapidly into selected long-haul
markets to balance their short-haul services, to enter vacation
markets quickly, and to balance their business travel patronage
with discretionary travel demand."
All of this is as it should be under the theory of airline deregula-
tion. Each carrier should respond to market forces in its own
way, and should enjoy or suffer the consequences of its decisions,
as the case may be. Greatly liberalized entry freedom (and rela-
tively improved exit flexibility) are the principal regulatory
changes which have made these varying carrier responses possible,
and which do the most to validate the labeling of the new statute
as "deregulation."
III. NEW AND ADDED REGULATION UNDER DEREGULATION
Although the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was promoted
and adopted on the theory that the government should get out of
the way and allow market forces to shape the nation's domestic
air transportation system, there are areas where the airline indus-
try is ironically suffering from new and added regulation as a
result of this law. Some of this is natural, such as the increased
"°Thus, during the twelve months ending September 30, 1979, the regional
carriers' total revenue ton miles grew 21.9% compared to only an 8.5% growth
for so-called domestic "trunklines," and the smaller carriers' net income de-
clined 14.1% compared to a 68.0% decline for the "trunklines." CIVIL AERO-
NAUTICS BOARD, CAB AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS AND QUARTERLY 6-7 (Sept.
1979); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, CAB AIR CARRIER INTERIM FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS (Sept. 1979).
" E.g., Applications of U.S. Air for Phoenix-Pittsburgh Authority, CAB
Order No. 78-11-41 (Nov. 9, 1978), Cincinnati/Baltimore-Orlando Authority,
CAB Order No. 79-3-14 (Mar. 1, 1979), Pittsburgh-Tampa Authority, CAB
Order No. 79-10-44 (Oct. 9, f979); Application of Piedmont Aviation for
Charlotte-Dallas-Ft. Worth/Houston Authority, CAB Order No. 79-3-14 (Mar.
1, 1979); Application of Republic Airlines for Chicago-Houston Authority, CAB
Order No. 79-3-14 (Mar. 1, 1979).
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application of the antitrust laws to the air transport industry as
the public utility controls fall away. Some of it, however, is con-
trived and unnecessary, and largely results from Congress' failure
to abolish the CAB when the deregulation law was passed.
A. Continuing CAB Bureaucracy
The entire CAB staff was left intact even though the deregula-
tion law relieved it of its major, traditional responsibilities in the
areas of route licensing and rate/fare regulation. With "time on
its hands" the agency has already turned to some new forms of
regulation, in an effort seemingly to shape the nature of the carrier's
responses to the new law.
This has not been a universal reaction by the entirety of the
agency's staff, and the effort to shape airline responses and to
become increasingly solicitous of the airline consumer has been
opposed by a number of staff members. This was particularly true
of Michael Levine, who was General Director prior to his de-
parture from the agency at the end of 1979, and who was a major
advocate of eliminating most of the old forms of public utility
control and of avoiding the introduction of excessive "consumer
protection" regulation."' Nevertheless, the tendency to move to-
ward increased regulation in the name of consumer protection is
definitely there on the part of other staff members.
B. Regulation of Day-to-Day Business Conduct
Especially troublesome is the developing tendency to prescribe
detailed rules for the conduct of air transport business, for ex-
ample: rules regarding how the airlines are to handle passengers
who, in the airline's good faith effort to deal with the costly and
serious no-show problem, suffer the inconvenience of an over-
sale;' detailed prescription as to how the industry is to handle
smoking versus non-smoking passengers, a subject over which the
CAB has dubious jurisdiction;" a proposal for hideously detailed
and costly rules for the carriage of handicapped passengers, an-
82 246 Av. DAILY 209 (1979).
- 14 C.F.R. S 250 (1978).
", A new rulemaking proposal threatens to increase the carriers' administra-
tive difficulties of accommodating the smoking and no-smoking preferences of
air travelers. EDR-377, CAB Docket No. 29,044 (May 16, 1979).
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other subject over which the agency has questionable jurisdiction;"
edicts as to what special notices are to be given concerning service
availability;" and proposals to intervene in contractual and financ-
ing arrangements between air carriers and airports."' All of this is
contrary to the theory that market forces, not the government,
should determine the quality and variety, as well as the quantity
and location, of air service, and constitutes an unnecessary burden
on carrier managements, impeding efficiency and productivity and
increasing costs that could have been avoided if the CAB had been
abolished when the Act of 1978 was passed.
C. New Congressional Programs
Congress itself is to blame in many respects for the added regu-
lation. In its fear that deregulation might cause too many tran-
sitional problems, Congress imposed some burdensome new re-
quirements. The small community program discussed above is
one. Another is a new requirement that each time an airline
changes a schedule to eliminate the last nonstop or single-plane
service in a market, the carrier must serve formal notice on numer-
ous persons, including state and local civic and aviation authori-
ties."' Such routine schedule changes have been made for many
years, with no noticeable objection from the public. Yet because
of the new notice requirements, the airlines are now burdened
with needless new paper work, which creates unnecessary confu-
sion and concern for most cities. Unfortunately, as in the small
community program, the CAB has rigidly applied the new statu-
tory provisions, a stance wholly inconsistent with deregulation
theory and one which would have been avoided had the CAB
been abolished at the time the new law was passed.
D. Increased "Consumer Protection" Activity
Perhaps the most troublesome area is the sudden increase in
I Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap. Special Regulations SPDR-70, CAB Docket No. 34,030 (May 31,
1979).
66 See CAB Order Nos. 78-9-34, 79-3-99 and 79-5-249.
67 The Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 8, 1979, at 10-D; The Atlanta Constitution,
Feb. 15, 1979, at 10-D.
"
6Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371(j)(2) (Supp. 1979);
14 C.F.R. S 323 (1979).
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so-called consumer protection activity, and a related Big Brother
tendency to investigate, monitor and control relations between the
airlines and their customers, by a relatively new CAB unit called
the Bureau of Consumer Protection."D At a time when free market
forces are supposed to be determining the quantity, variety and
quality of service, this particular bureau is ironically engaging
in increasingly rigid, detailed surveillance of the carriers' rela-
tionships with their customers. Indeed, the Bureau even boasts
about its aggressive new role as allegedly consistent with deregula-
tion, and contends that the new regime justifies imposing fines
on the industry of a "traffic ticket" nature." This is the sort of
federal government regulation that is doing so much to undermine
the efficiency and productivity of this country and even to under-
mine the individual freedoms' which made this country unique and
envied for so many years.
These "consumerist" activities are directed at such diverse sub-
jects as airline advertising, airline application of the CAB's un-
necessary "no smoking" regulations, the timeliness of schedule
performance, and the handling of customer claims, refund requests
89 The predecessor staff arm of the CAB was the Bureau of Enforcement; the
change in name to a broader "protective" function signifies the determination of
this unit to go beyond mere enforcement of the law to an activist watchdog role
not called for by any known consumer grievances against the industry nor by
the language of the revised statute.
" In response to several isolated complaints during 1979 from passengers
concerning Delta's application of the CAB smoking regulations, the Director
of the Bureau of Consumer Protection concluded that Delta had infringed the
regulations and offered to settle the matter without enforcement action if Delta
would submit payments of $500 per violation. Delta replied that payment of
such fines for isolated incidents was inappropriate, especially in light of Delta's
exemplary record of satisfying passengers and in light of the procompetitive,
anti-regulatory thrust of the deregulation law. To these statements, the Bureau's
Director responded:
Our policy of seeking 'traffic ticket' civil penalties by negotiation
or litigation for failing to comply with basic rules established by
the Board-like assuring every passenger who wants one a seat free
from unwanted smoke-is in no way inconsistent with the Deregula-
tion Act or procompetitive Board policies. The approach sets a basic
target and leaves to the carriers how to meet it, without attempting
to tell them in detail how to do so. Missing the target, however, can
cost money in particular cases.
Letter from Reuben Robertson, Director of Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Civil Aeronautics Board, to Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Dec. 6, 1979) (letter avail-
able at the office of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce) (emphasis added).
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or other complaints."' There is nothing in the new law which calls
for this sort of policing of the carriers. To the contrary, the new
law expressly requires the CAB to rely on "actual and potential






The Bureau's Director, a former Ralph Nader associate, claims
support for this increased policing and investigatory activity on
the theory that the deregulation law gives the CAB the power, for
the first time, to assess civil penalties for statutory violations on
its own, without having to resort to the federal courts." This was
merely an attempt by Congress to streamline procedures, not to
create a new and strengthened specialized consumer protection
agency. Indeed, such an interpretation of a mere procedural
change flies in the face of Congress' rejection of efforts to create
an omnibus consumer protection agency, and is anything but con-
sistent with the general trend toward deregulation, the curtailment
of the Federal Trade Commission, the abolition of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board and, hopefully, other federal agencies and depart-
ments as well.
Nor was there any public clamor for the sudden imposition
of this sort of consumer protection activity. The airline industry
has for years had one of the highest ratings among all major in-
dustries in terms of passenger satisfaction with both basic product
and complaint handling."4 Why then, when Congress has said that
the airlines' conduct is to be governed by free market forces, is
this industry suddenly singled out and faced with a specialized
group of bureaucrats who have arrogated to themselves the task
of protecting the consumer just against the airlines?
The danger is that this bureau may be attempting to create an
empire sufficient to cause Congress to change: its mind about the
planned abolition of the CAB in 1985, or to prepare for a mas-
sive transfer of personnel to a sister agency with a specialized and
"'The Bureau of Consumer Protection is in almost daily contact with air-
line personnel regarding the disposition of the most minor customer grievances.
These contacts include inquiries concerning claims procedures, and requests for
extensive amounts of internal company memoranda and files.
92 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (9) (Supp. 1979).
"Id. 5 1471.
94 See note 4, supra.
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unique mission of regulating the business conduct of airlines.
Indeed, these objectives were enunciated rather clearly by the
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection in testimony before
the House Appropriations Subcommittee in March of 1979:
We certainly do not foresee any increase in the current level of
resources. If it becomes apparent that the airlines have taken the
consumer interest to heart and are effectively dealing with con-
sumer problems we will reduce our staffing accordingly. However,
volume of consumer complaints has been rising at a rate of 30
percent for the past year and we do not anticipate that it will level
off or decrease.
We are directing our efforts toward putting in place a system of
rules to protect the consumer after the demise of the Board,
although there is no provision in existing legislation to transfer
consumer protection regulations to another agency. We cannot
assume that the airlines will protect the consumer at the expense
of profit in an unregulated environment. Among the major areas
of concern are oversales, baggage liability, advertising, adequate
disclosure of rules governing discount fares, smoking, and airline
liability to passengers when schedules are changed or flights are
delayed or cancelled for reasons other than safety. The rules we
are developing in these areas should be incorporated into the
regulations of another agency (Department of Transportation or
Federal Trade Commission) during the last years of the Board's
existence. Consumer staff who are knowledgeable about these
rules can be transferred to another agency to handle air trans-
portation problems.'
The premises in this testimony are absurd-that it is not yet
"apparent" that "the airlines have taken the consumer interest to
heart" and a stubborn, blind, refusal by the bureaucrat to "assume"
that the airlines will protect the consumer without oppressive
governmental hand-holding and dictation. Remember that the
airlines ranked number one in consumer satisfaction before the
bureaucrats thought it necessary to intervene with so-called con-
sumer protection regulation. The absurdity of the premises is
"I Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 6 at 269-270 (1979). The claim
that consumer complaints to the CAB are increasing in volume is questionable,
because in some respects the Bureau of Consumer Protection has encouraged
such complaining just as it has also encouraged consumers to litigate against
the airlines without regard to the degree of merit in their complaint.
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further shown by the testimony of CAB Chairman Cohen at the
very same hearing, which recognized that these consumer polls
"indicate a high level of satisfaction with airline services."'" In-
deed, after making the above-quoted statement, the Director of
the Bureau of Consumer Protection recognized the eflectiveness of
airline consumer affairs offices in resolving grievances, but never-
theless still seemed to feel compelled to use his staff to badger
the airlines into doing it the government's way:
In the last few years most of the major airlines serving the
United States, both foreign and domestic, have established con-
sumer affairs offices.
In general, these offices are effective in resolving individual com-
plaints but lack authority to make policy in their companies. Our
consumer staff monitors the handling of complaints and calls
meetings with airline management when they feel that the airlines
are not doing a good job.
The Bureau of Consumer Protection has underway a project to
encourage airlines to set up mediation boards to resolve the com-
plaints that cannot be resolved through the usual procedures. '
The empire building is obvious. The stage apparently is being set
to persuade Congress either to continue the CAB in existence as
a specialized consumer protection agency, or to create a specialized
"Id. at 113. More recently, however, Chairman Cohen is reported to have
told the New York Security Analysts that "There may be a need for further
legislation of the deregulation policy to provide for continued consumer pro-
tection activities." 247 Av. DAILY 146 (1980). Hopefully this only refers to
the fact that under the present Act, there is no provision for eliminating the
airlines' exemption from Federal Trade Commission regulation when the Civil
Aeronautics Board's authority goes out of existence, an exemption which probably
should be terminated at that time, thereby generally subjecting the airlines to
FTC jurisdiction in the same manner that other businesses are so subject. Hope-
fully it does not mean that Chairman Cohen has surrendered to the empire
builders, so that he, too, is now advocating continued existence of the CAB as
a specialized consumer protection agency or a massive transfer of airline con-
sumerist interests to a specialized bureau within the FTC.
97Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1980: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Transp. of the House Comm. on Appro-
priations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. Part 6, at 270. It might be noted that Delta Air
Lines, and probably other airlines as well, have had customer relations offices
for many years. At Delta, whether or not the office "makes policy," it reports to
a high ranking staff officer (Vice Chairman of the Board) and is thus in a posi-
tion to make recommendations openly and freely for changes in policy and pro-
cedure by the operating and passenger handling departments of the company.
In any event, if these offices are "effective" with the consumer, what does it
matter whether they have "authority to make policy" within the company or not?
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airline bureau in the Federal Trade Commission, with the sole
responsibility of second-guessing airline managements. That hardly
is deregulation!
If the CAB does go out of existence, it is only natural that the
airlines should then become subject to Federal Trade Commission
regulation. There is no need to create a special set of regulations
just for the airlines, to be administered by career airline harassers.
E. Labor Protection
Labor protection provisions are another area where Congress
added regulation rather than deregulation. In order to overcome
labor opposition to deregulation, Congress included provisions
which require federal payments to workers displaced by deregula-
tion, if any. Even worse, the law purports to require airlines to
give hiring preference to employees of other airlines who, for
any reason other than cause, are laid off or terminated (the worker
would retain seniority rights with his own company, and thus
might prove to be temporary help at best)."' The Department of
Labor has proposed some gruesomely complex and burdensome
regulations to implement this program," which rival the worst this
writer has ever seen a socialist government impose. There are
serious questions as to the constitutionality of this program, but
for the time being it is another area of potential added regulation
that is totally out of tune with the concept of deregulation.
F. Antitrust Regulation
Under the prior law, any intercarrier agreement, merger or
interlocking relationship approved by the CAB under sections 408
or 412 of the Federal Aviation Act was immune from the anti-
trust laws."® The new law is considerably different; it states that
immunity will be granted, but only to the extent necessary, to
:8 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1552(a)-(d) (Supp. 1979).
9"Airline Employee Protection Program, Part 638, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,148
(1979). Under section 43 of the Airline Deregulation Act, these proposed regula-
tions, when finalized, must be submitted to Congress for review and are subject
to disapproval by either house. Id. § 1552(f)(3). As of this time, a final pro-
posal has not yet been submitted to Congress, although an earlier version was
submitted for the preliminary thirty-day review also required by section 43. 20
C.F.R. § 638, Proposed Rulemaking, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,146 (1979).
10049 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976).
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transactions specifically approved by the CAB and transactions
necessarily contemplated by such CAB order. Most importantly,
under the new law immunity grants are discretionary with the
CAB and will be made only if "required in the public interest.....
These statutory changes leave little doubt of Congress' intent
that the antitrust laws should become more and more applicable
to the air transport industry as the former economic regulation
withers away. By leaving the CAB in existence, however, under
a broad procompetitive policy statement and with discretionary
powers as to antitrust and as to areas of inquiry to which it can
turn its attention, the Congress has, perhaps unintentionally, im-
posed upon airlines a very specialized application of the anti-
trust laws."
Antitrust units have been set up in three of the CAB's major
bureaus: the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the Bureau of
Domestic Aviation, and the Office of General Counsel. These
units, and indeed the entire agency, are excessively suspicious
that the airline industry was riddled with anticompetitive practices
in the past, which must now be ferreted out and eliminated. These
suspicions have already led to a number of formal and informal
investigations and proceedings with which the industry must cur-
rently deal.
For example, the antitrust emphasis has led the CAB to move
fairly rapidly toward a significant curtailment of the airline in-
dustry's basic trade associations. While the antitrust laws will per-
mit the airlines (like other industries) to participate in trade
association activities, much traditional and beneficial industry
standardization, such as the system of uniform, industry-wide
practices in many areas for the conduct of interline business (e.g.,
uniform ticketing, baggage handling) which were of special help
to passengers using more than one airline, may disappear or at
least be weakened.
An extensive investigation into the structure and mechanisms
101 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1384 (Supp. 1979). Even
before passage of the deregulation act, the CAB was not favorably inclined toward
requests for antitrust immunity. See Motion of Popular Latin Travel Agency,
Inc., CAB Order No. 78-10-31, at 5 (Oct. 5, 1978); Texas International-National
Acquisition Case, CAB Order No. 78-8-150, at 5 (Aug. 25, 1978); Applications
of Frontier Airlines, Transworld Airlines and Ass'n of Retail Travel Agents for
Discussion Authority, CAB Order No. 78-7-110, at 5 (July 21, 1978).
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of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) was insti-
tuted with a view toward restructuring that organization.1" The
CAB initially set out to extinguish the most vital components of
the IATA organization at least as they applied to transportation
to and from the United States, the world's largest air transporta-
tion market. These components included mechanisms for deter-
mining international fares, commissions, accreditation of travel
agents, and other programs for standardizing and regularizing
international services. After holding a series of public inquiries in
foreign countries into the ramifications of these United States
objectives, the CAB was forced to retrench somewhat because of
the almost uniform opposition of foreign governments.
The Board's initial objective of extensive dismantling of IATA
structures has been revamped. Instead of a total disapproval of
IATA fare-setting mechanisms, the Board now proposes to con-
tinue the antitrust immunity for the IATA rate-setting machinery,
except that United States carriers will not be granted immunity
as to United States-Europe operations.'" The review of IATA
mechanisms continues, although on a much less ambitious footing
than that the CAB originally intended. In any event, the Board's
policies stand to have a significant impact on various aspects of
foreign air transportation.
Similarly, the Board has instituted an expansive investigation
into all aspects of the marketing of both domestic and interna-
tional air transportation which will involve a broad-scale exami-
nation of the existing marketing systems, including how they may
'
02With or without the CAB, unless the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
is amended the airlines will be in a somewhat unique position with respect to
certain antitrust matters. Thus, while the antitrust laws will be generally applic-
able to the industry, especially if the CAB ceases to exist in 1985, the deregula-
tion act contemplates that the Department of Justice will also administer sec-
tions 408, 409, 412, and 414 of the revised aviation statute which will continue
to apply to the industry. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. §
1557(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 1979). These sections set forth governing principles for
airline mergers and consolidations, interlocking relationships, intercarrier agree-
ments, and antitrust immunity. Although it is likely that these sections will be
interpreted along largely traditional antitrust lines, all of the sections vary to some
degree from those traditional principles.
'0 Agreement Adopted by the International Air Transport Association Relat-
ing to the Traffic Conference (IATA Review Case), CAB Docket No. 32,851
(Sept. 11, 1979).
"'JSee CAB Press Release No. 79-257 (Dec. 5, 1979).
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be modified to increase competition. " This massive investigation
encompasses many intercarrier arrangements for marketing air
transportation, including such matters as travel agency accredita-
tion standards and practices, distributive methods for selling air
services, automated reservations system access and practices, and
other industry mechanisms for doing business.
It is submitted that this specialized application of the anti-
trust laws by the CAB could and should have been avoided. A
natural transition to an antitrust regime could have occurred if
Congress had simply abolished the agency and created a short
transition period of a few years allowing existing antitrust immu-
nities to remain effective. During that period, the industry would
have been left free to restructure activities which had been handled
on a cooperative, uniform, industry-wide basis for the public's
benefit. There was no need for governmental prescription of the
precise manner in which the industry should proceed, as is now
being given by the CAB-and again, no reason to have continued
the agency in existence. Hopefully, much of this specialized anti-
trust regulation and other interference will disappear when the
CAB is abolished, and let it come soon!
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Until 1978, the federal statutes contained no specific provision
preempting state economic regulation of air transportation. As a
result, a few states exercised jurisdiction over intrastate air trans-
portation, including operations within a state by an interstate car-
rier even when part of a continuous journey. This state authority
was especially exercised in connection with rates and fares. For
example, in California, the state regulation sometimes required
interstate carriers on flights between two points within the state
to charge different fares for passengers whose flights were wholly
within that state vis a vis passengers connecting to out of state
flights. Nevada required carriers operating within the state to hold
105Investigation into Competitive Marketing of Air Transportation, CAB
Docket No. 36,595 (Sept. 13, 1979). In conjunction with the investigation, an
order to show cause has already been issued which proposes to eliminate both
standard travel agency commission levels for sales of domestic air transportation
and certain restrictions on agent compensation. Investigation into Competitive
Marketing of Air Transportation, CAB Order No. 79-9-65 (Sept. 13, 1979).
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state certificates (or licenses) and regulated the carriers, includ-
ing interstate carriers, in other ways as wellR .
The deregulation statute contains an express preemption provi-
sion. Section 13057 provides that no state or political subdivision
and no interstate agency shall enact or enforce any law or regula-
tion concerning rates, routes, or services of any carrier having
authority under Title IV of the Act to provide interstate air
transportation.""8 The statute further provides that upon receipt
of authority from the CAB, an intrastate carrier is deemed to have
obtained all of its authority from the Board under Title IV.' 0
The first judicial test of this preemption provision is pending
in the Ninth Circuit. After the deregulation act was passed, the
California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) attempted to exer-
cise rate jurisdiction (as it had in the past) by ordering Hughes
Airwest (a federally certificated carrier) to maintain an existing
level of fares in intra-California markets, despite CAB approval
to increase such fares. Hughes Airwest, several other carriers, the
CAB, and the Department of Justice filed suit against the PUC.
In March, 1979, a permanent injunction was granted, preventing
the PUC from regulating the routes, rates, and services of the
plaintiff carriers. The PUC has appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
V. OTHER ASPECTS OF CURRENT BOARD POLICY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE DEREGULATION LAW
Other CAB activities in the aftermath of the deregulation act
are interesting, some clearly deregulatory, and others only mas-
querading under that label. Examples in the deregulatory category
'0 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.070, 704.100, 704.110, 704.120 (1977); 704.270,
704.280 (1973); and 704.330 (1975). See also Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, The
Intrastate Regulation Experience in Texas and California, supra note 4.
'
07Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (Supp. 1979).
'm Alaska is excepted from the purview of the preemption provision where
the authority conferred by the CAB on the intrastate carriers is not certificated.
Id. § 1305(a)(2) (Supp. 1979).
'
00 Id. § 1305(c).
110 Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, No. C78-2880-SW (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 1978). The PUC's principal argument is that the tenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting legisla-
tion interfering with the regulation of purely intrastate air service by a state
government. Oral argument on the appeal is expected during the spring of 1980.
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include certain rulemaking changes to allow the carriers virtually
unfettered discretion to grant free or reduced rate transportation
to travel agents.' Also clearly in the deregulatory vein is a pro-
posal to allow carriers complete flexibility to barter air transporta-
tion for goods and services (including but not limited to advertising
services), and to allow carriers to grant free or reduced rate trans-
portation to "persons promoting air transportation."M2
Under the banner of deregulation, the CAB has issued another
rulemaking proposal which would allegedly permit competitive
negotiation between the carriers and the United States Postal Serv-
ice (USPS) concerning payment for the carriage of mail.' The
Board proposes to modify the traditional system of CAB prescribed
mail rates so as to allow the USPS to negotiate rates with the car-
riers within certain zones fixed by the CAB. The proposal would
produce a one-sided "open market," however, because the upper
limit of the zone would be set at the level prescribed today by the
CAB under the traditional rate-setting machinery for mail carri-
age rates. Thus, the USPS would be free to negotiate rates down-
ward, and would retain its traditional powers to impose regulations
requiring mail carriage on a priority basis, and to levy fines against
carriers for failure to comply with USPS directives.
In response to the CAB proposal, Delta has filed a document
strongly urging the CAB to permit a truly competitive, free market
for the carriage of mail, by eliminating the airlines' duty to carry
the mail, and the Postal Service's powers to issue regulations and
levy fines."' Essentially, under Delta's proposal, the USPS would
be treated like other shippers, and would engage in competitive
bidding for air transportation in an open, unregulated environment.
VI. INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
In an effort to transpose some of the procompetitive principles
and other provisions of the deregulation act to international air
transportation, the Congress has recently enacted the International
,,14 C.F.R. § 223.2(f) (1978).
", EDR-391, CAB Docket No. 35,392 (Nov. 1, 1979).
", EDR-387, CAB Docket No. 36,497 (Oct. 9, 1979).
"1 EDR-387/PDR-68, CAB Docket No. 36,497 (Oct. 9, 1979); Comments
of Delta Air Lines, Inc. dated October 19, 1979.
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Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979.115 In addition to the
strong enunciation of procompetitive policies and goals for inter-
national transportation like those now applicable to interstate and
overseas transportation, the new law extends to international trans-
portation fare flexibility and standard fare adjustment provisions
similar to those adopted in the deregulation act. Thus, the law
creates a "standard foreign fare level" (SFFL) comparable to the
"standard industry fare level" (SIFL) in domestic and overseas
service. The SFFL is based upon fares in effect on October 1,
1979, except that the CAB has discretion to establish a different
SFFL for markets with as much as 25% of total traffic carried
by United States carriers in foreign air transportation. Like the
domestic SIFL, the SFFL must be adjusted periodically: in the
case of fuel cost changes, every sixty days; and for other cost
changes, at least semiannually."' Within the zone of 5% above
the SFFL and 50% below, carriers would be free to adjust fares
with limited provision for suspension by the CAB.117
The new law makes it clear that international authority for
United States carriers may not be altered, modified, suspended or
revoked through the simplified procedures now provided by sub-
section p of section 401 of the Act,' 8 if the certificate holder
requests an oral evidentiary hearing or if the Board determines
that such a hearing is in the public interest.11 On the other hand,
the law would give the Board authority to revoke or suspend un-
exercised foreign rights, subject to certain notice requirements
and an "opportunity" (without hearing) for the certificate holder
to present its views.120
The legislation also authorizes carriage of interstate and over-
1 Pub. L. No. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (to be codified at scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
'I Id. § 24 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1482(j)).
117 Id. Some suspension powers have been left with the Board, including the
right to suspend fares above the SFFL based upon findings of undue preference
or prejudice, or unjust discrimination. Similarly, decreases below the SFFL can
be suspended based upon predation or discrimination findings. In all cases, the
CAB retains suspension power where it can find that the public interest demands
suspension because of "unreasonable regulatory action of a foreign government."
Id.
"1Id. § 6 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) & (p)).
"OId. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. S 1371(g)(1)-(2)).
'
20 d. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g)(3)).
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seas traffic by foreign carriers, under certain highly circumscribed
conditions. Thus, foreign carriers may receive exemptions (not
to exceed thirty days) to engage in overseas and interstate air
transportation if the CAB finds after consultation with the Depart-
ment of Transportation that an emergency exists "not arising in
the normal course of business," and that all possible efforts have
been made to have the traffic accommodated by United States
carriers."1
Other changes include the application of the modified bank
merger/local cartage test to all intercarrier agreements-domestic
and international-with some recognition of international comity
and foreign policy considerations as public interest factors which
may be sufficient to justify otherwise anticompetitive agreements.""
The revised law gives the Secretary of Transportation authority to
permit foreign-registered aircraft to operate between United States
points under a lease (without crew) to a United States carrier. '"
The law also extends the prohibition against "part charters" (the
commingling of charter passengers with scheduled passengers)
until December 31, 1981." '
VII. CONCLUSION
So far, airline deregulation is a "mixed bag"--some deregula-
tion, some new regulation, and great confusion from the regulators
left around to deregulate! The central question is whether the
CAB actually will go out of existence. Congress has slated the
21 Id. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. S 1386(b)(7)). If this be considered to be
the carriage of cabotage traffic by foreign flag carriers, the Chicago Convention
may require that this privilege, if granted to any one foreign carrier, also be
granted to all foreign carriers that desire to operate in the market in question.
The American Bar Association suggested a provision which would have avoided
any cabotage grants to foreign air carriers; a procedure whereby, in an emer-
gency situation, United States carriers could lease blocks of seats on foreign
air carrier flights, and therefore the U.S. carriers would hold the availability of
these seats out to the public and would control the transportation. International
Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1300 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Commerce Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
247 (1979).
122 Pub. L. No. 96-192, S 11, 94 Stat. 39 (1980) (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
S 1382)).
12 3 1d. 5 13 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b) (7)).
124 Id. S 26 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. 5 1371(n)(I)).
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
abolition of the agency for 1985, after two major reductions of
its power, first, its loss of all route and entry control after 1981, and
second, its loss of power over passenger fares after 1982.
Congress will, however, review the situation prior to 1985. Can
Congress resist the inevitable pressures from the empire builders
to continue the CAB as a consumer protection agency, or demands
for exit restrictions from communities fearful of an unwanted
service diminution? Will Congress give the agency a reprieve dur-
ing some economic adversity so that it can regulate anew in the
future? Many of those who are even now bringing such pressure
to bear continue to call the airlines "public utilities," although the
economic theory of deregulation clearly viewed the airlines as
just a part of the general run of United States business. Congress'
mistake in leaving the CAB in existence has exacerbated this
problem, by providing a forum before which to continue the de-
regulation debate.
As a result, the airline industry has not been given full freedom
to respond to market forces and to the changes which have been
wrought in the regulatory environment. Deregulation cannot be
achieved without immediate and total abolition of the regulatory
agency involved.
Abolition of the CAB should occur as soon as possible. The air-
line industry has been thoroughly "scrambled" as a result of the
deregulation law and CAB programs. It would be a grave injustice
to both the industry and the public to attempt a return to a public
utility regulatory system or to move so soon to a new system of
regulation. Now that Congress has chosen the deregulatory course,
it is only fair to proceed promptly to implement real deregulation
to see if it will work and to assess the results.
It is therefore encouraging to hear Senator Cannon say that:
While airline deregulation is not perfect, it is the law and, in my
opinion, will stay in the law for a long, long time. So let's turn our
energies to maximizing its benefits and minimizing its dislocations,
rather than continuing as some have to look over their shoulders
and wonder if we should try to 'go home again. '
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This writer and Delta agree. If the CAB in fact expires on schedule
or earlier, that will hopefully emphasize the need for real deregula-
tion throughout the government and real shrinkage of the bloated
federal system.
